The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining Agreements by Cox, Archibald
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 57 Issue 1 
1958 
The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining Agreements 
Archibald Cox 
Harvard Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Agency Commons, Contracts Commons, Dispute Resolution and Arbitration Commons, 
and the Labor and Employment Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Archibald Cox, The Legal Nature of Collective Bargaining Agreements, 57 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1958). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol57/iss1/2 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW 
Vol. 57 NOVEMBER 1958 No. I 




0 NE reflecting upon the legal nature of a collective bargaining agreement can hardly avoid beginning with the thought that 
the institution has flourished outside of the courts and admin-
istrative agencies and often in the face of legal interference. The 
law had fallen into disrepute in the world of labor relations 
because it failed to meet the needs of men. Collective bargaining 
agreements were negotiated and administered without regard to 
conventional legal sanctions. Grievance procedures and arbitration 
evolved into an intricate and highly organized, private judicature. 
Many experienced and perceptive observers argued that the con-
ventional sanctions for commercial contracts should not apply 
to labor agreements.1 
The national labor policy is now set upon another course. 
Section 30 I of the Labor Management Relations Act2 supplied 
legal sanctions for collective bargaining agreements, and no one 
supposes that time will reverse the decision. There are increasing 
numbers of direct suits to enforce rights under labor contracts. 
Arbitration cases may also bring the courts farther into the ad-
ministration of collective bargaining agreements. Textile Workers 
Union v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama3 affords an opportunity to 
compel a recalcitrant party to proceed to arbitration, but in doing 
so it also necessarily grants the party who is reluctant to arbitrate 
a forum in which to raise questions of arbitrability; heretofore 
he supposed that he was forced to take his chances with the arbi-
trator or risk the accusation of bad faith. In the unhappy event that 
the federal courts embrace the Cutler-Hammer doctrine, they will 
•An address delivered at an institute on Collective Bargaining and the Law, The 
University of Michigan Law School, August I, 1958-Ed. 
tRoyall Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.-Ed. 
l Much the best exposition of this philosophy is Shulman, "Reason, Contract, and 
Law in Labor Relations," 68 HARV. L. REV. 999 at 1001-1002, 1024 (1955). 
2 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §185. 
3 353 U.S. 448 (1957). 
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frequently be called upon to decide whether the claim sought to 
be arbitrated raises a disputable issue or one so frivolous that 
arbitration should not be ordered-a formula which inevitably 
takes the court into the merits of the dispute.4 
In my opinion both the institutions of self-government pro-
liferated by collective bargaining and the surrounding legal system 
can gain strength from mutual support but, whether one approves 
or disapproves the trend, it must be recognized that section 30 I 
and the Lincoln Mills case draw the courts a considerable distance 
into both the interpretation of collective bargaining agreements 
and the formulation of legal principles to govern their judicial 
enforcement. By instructing the federal courts to create a body 
of substantive law applicable to suits under section 301, the same 
case has given the profession an extraordinary creative oppor-
tunity. There are no settled rules governing rights and remedies 
under collective bargaining agreements.5 Whether judges apply 
existing contract doctrines blindly or accommodate the law to the 
needs of the industrial world will depend upon the imagination 
and attitude of labor Ia·wyers. 
4 In International Assn. of Machinists v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 271 App. Div. 917 at 
918, 67 N.Y.S. (2d) 317 (1947), affd. 297 N.Y. 519, 74 N.E. (2d) 464 (1947), the court held: 
"While the contract provides for arbitration of disputes as to the 'meaning, performance, 
non-performance or application' of its provisions, the mere assertion by a party of a 
meaning of a provision which is clearly contrary to the plain meaning of the words cannot 
make an arbitrable issue. It is for the Court to determine whether the contract contains 
a provision for arbitration of the dispute tendered, and in the exercise of that jurisdiction 
the Court must determine whether there is such a dispute. If the meaning of the provision 
of the contract sought to be arbitrated is beyond dispute, there cannot be anything to 
arbitrate and the contract cannot be said to provide for arbitration." The doctrine is highly 
controversial. Compare Marceau, "Are All Interpretations 'Admissible'?" 12 ARB. J. 150 
(1957), with Summers, "Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration," 2 BUFFALO L. REv. 1 
(1952) and Cox, "Current Problems in the Law of Grievance Arbitration," 30 ROCKY MT. 
L. REv. 247 at 258-266 (1958). It is an open question whether the doctrine will be adopted 
by the federal courts. See, e.g., Local 149, American Federation of Technical Engineers 
v. General Electric Co., (1st Cir. 1957) 250 F. (2d) 922; In re Jacobson, (D.C. Mass. 1958) 
42 L.R.R.M. 2070; -New Bedford Defense Products Div. of Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. 
v. Intl. Union, UAW, (D.C. Mass. 1958) 160 F. Supp. 103. 
5 There are scattered state decisions which the federal judges may use as precedents 
in the same way that one state supreme court looks to the decisions in another jurisdic-
tion. Thus the Lincoln Mills opinion declares that "state law, if compatible with the 
purpose of §301, may be resorted to in order to find the rule that will best effectuate 
the federal policy .... Any state law applied, however, will be absorbed as federal 
law and will not be an independent source of private rights." 353 U.S. 448 at 457. The 
general principles of contract law may also furnish decisional criteria. In each instance, 
however, the federal courts will have a power of choice until a federal law of collective 
bargaining agreements has been developed. It seems virtually certain that the federal 
substantive law will oust state law fyom the whole field of cases affecting interstate 
commerce. Mccarroll v. Los Angeles County District Council of Carpenters, 49 Cal. (2d) 
45, 315 P. (2d) 322 (1957). 
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The starting point is sure to be the familiar rules of contract 
law. Williston tells us that a "contract is a promise, or a set of 
promises, for breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the 
performance of which the law in some way recognizes as a duty."6 
Pound and Corbin give essentially the same definition.7 Since 1947 
a collective bargaining agreement has been a set of promises which 
the law will enforce. Indeed it is a contract within any acceptable 
definition. 
Looking a little deeper it seems fair to say that voluntarism 
and bargain are the two fundamental qualities of contract. The 
very notion of contract implies acceptance of an obligation which 
the law does not impose. A promise is a consensual undertaking. 
Ordinarily a contract also involves exchange. 
Voluntarism and bargain are also significant ingredients of a 
collective bargaining agreement. The law leaves the employer and 
the collectivity of employees free to agree or refrain from agree-
ment subject only to the obligation that they bargain in good 
faith. The terms of the bargain are not determined by the govern-
ment; in this respect both management and labor enjoy much 
greater freedom than a utility or insurance company dealing with 
the public. 
In fact neither the employer nor the employees collectively 
have the freedom to disagree which characterizes typical contracts 
between business firms and individuals. Sooner or later the em-
ployer and employees must strike some kind of a bargain. For 
both the costs of delay can be very heavy. The compulsion has 
two relevant consequences. First, it partially explains the gaps 
and deliberate ambiguities in collective bargaining agreements 
which create distinctive problems of interpretation. The pressure 
to reach an agreement is so great that the parties are willing to 
contract although each knows that the other places a different 
meaning on the words and they share only the common intent to 
postpone the issue and take a gamble upon an arbitrator's ruling 
if decision is required.8 Second, the importance of having some 
6 WILLISI'ON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed., §1 (1936). 
7 "Contracts," 4 ENCYC. Soc. SCI. 323 (1931). 
s The same phenomenon appears in legislation, probably more often than outsiders 
realize. The best example to come to my attention is NLRA §S(c), 61 Stat. 142 (1947), 
29 U.S.C. (1952) §158(c). The House bill [H.R. 3020, 80th Cong., 1st sess. (1947)] immunized 
an employer's anti-union speech "if it does not by its own terms threaten force or economic 
reprisal." As passed by the Senate [S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st sess. (1947)], the bill granted 
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agreement means that the arbitrator can hardly say that there was 
no meeting of the minds upon the question before him, that there-
fore there was no contract, and that the parties should go back and 
negotiate a solution.9 
These consequences of the practical compulsion to sign and 
preserve collective agreements mean that interpretation must 
assume a more creative role than in most commercial or property 
litigation. I shall return to this point later but I take it that 
neither the practical qualifications nor their consequences can 
obscure the importance of the elements of voluntarism and bargain 
in both ordinary contracts and collective bargaining agreements. 
If these reasons for thinking that contract will be the starting 
point in evolving a law of collective agreements seem too theo-
reticaf let me suggest a very practical reason: One must start 
somewhere and there is no better place to begin. If you doubt the 
force of this consideration, reflect upon the number of opinions by 
experienced labor arbitrators invoking ordinary contract prin-
ciples as grounds of decision. 
Among the arbitration fraternity and in academic circles it 
has been fashionable to stress the uniqueness of collective bargain-
ing agreements. Clyde Summers tells us: 
"The collective agreement differs as much from the common 
contract as Humpty Dumpty differs from a common egg. 
The failure of the courts to see and remember the differ-
ences causes confusion and leads them to blunder. They 
misconceive the relationship, hobble arbitration, and misin-
terpret the agreement, and defeat the intent of the parties-
all because they forget they are in a world quite unlike their 
own."10 
immunity "if such statement contains under all the circumstances no threat, express or 
implied, of reprisal or force. . . ." Conference committee deleted the italicized phrases 
from both bills. 
9 The point is illustrated by a typical arbitration case. The issue was whether a 
company, at a time of very heavy cut-backs, could put foremen back to work in the 
bargaining unit according to seniority based upon total years of service with the company 
or, if not, then according to seniority accumulated between the date of first employment 
and the date of promotion. The contract was absolutely ·blind. It seems certain that the 
parties had never thought about the pending situation. I am certain, however, that j:)oth 
sides would have been outraged if I had said that this was an omitted case on which 
they should go back and negotiate because there had been no meeting of the minds. 
Indeed the company and union were negotiating a new agreement at the time they sub-
mitted the case for decision. In effect they wished me to write the relevant terms of the 
new agreement while construing the old. 
10 Summers, "Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration," 2 BUFFALO L. REv. 1 at 17-18 
(1952). 
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Often the difference is important, but the time has passed when 
we could simply erect a "no trespassing" sign and separate indus-
trial relations from the law. The law has moved into the sphere 
of grievance adjustment and contract administration. Labor 
relations has spilled over into judicial territory. Labor, manage-
ment, and arbitrators must recognize that the law often expresses 
ideals and needs of society which limit their freedom of action. The 
law of contracts often embodies these ideals. It may also embody 
lessons of experience entirely applicable to collective bargaining 
agreements. Conversely the law can satisfy the needs of the indus-
trial world only if there is a strong infusion of many of the ideas 
and conventions, heretofore unknown to law but appropriate to 
group action, which have gained acceptance in the world of labor 
relations. It is not enough to halt after taking the important first 
step of emphasizing the unique aspects of collective bargaining 
agreements. 
First, we must press on to show how these peculiar qualities 
affect the application of the normal principles of contract inter-
pretation and enforcement. 
Second, we should seek a synthesis of our notions concerning 
collective bargaining agreements-an explanation of their inner 
logic-a coherent description not merely of the institution but of 
its legal consequences. Judges cannot be expected to perceive the 
legal nature of a collective bargaining agreement if those whose· 
lives straddle labor relations and the law cannot articulate their 
perceptions. 
It would be satisfying to offer a tentative thesis. This paper is 
only an effort to illustrate the interplay between some of the 
special institutional characteristics of collective agreements and 
the applicability of normal contract and agency rules. 
II 
A unique characteristic of a collective bargaining agreement is 
the number of people affected. The habit of speaking of a tri-
angular relationship involving employer, labor union, and in-
dividual employees obscures the number of employees and the· 
complexity of their interests. Under some contracts the number 
of individual employees reaches tens of thousands; it is usually 
more than fifty. The identity of the employees may change from 
day to day; Joe Smith quits but Annie Jones is hired. Often 
several employees have conflicting interests, as where the. claim 
6 MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW [ Vol. 57 
is that some are being permitted to deprive others of work by doing 
jobs outside of their own classification. The second party-the 
labor union or collective bargaining representative-is in a very 
teal sense only the third party-the individual employees-acting 
as an organized group through its agents and constitutional proc- · 
~sses. Thus, if we think of the union as an agent and the 
employees as principals, we have the paradox that the agent is only 
the principals acting as an organization. The group interests, 
however, may conflict with the claims of individuals because 
~everal classes of individuals have divergent interests, because the 
d~mands of group organization and coherence clash with indi-
vidual self-interest, or even because the union officialdom is not 
fmmediately responsive to the wishes of a numerical majority of 
the me.mbers. Since experience offers no factual parallel to these 
~rrangements, no other legal conception is quite analogous. 
· A group cannot function effectively without rules for its govern-
ment. When the group is a wholly voluntary association it may 
adopt its own rules, but under collective bargaining the group 
is only partly voluntary and the Railway Labor and National 
L~bpr Relations Acts provide rules for its government. NLRA 
section 9 (a) provides that the representatives designated by a 
majority of the employees in a bargaining unit shall be the 
exclusive representatives of all the employees in the unit.11 The 
~ ational Labor Relations Board defines the bargaining unit and 
9-etermines when and how the representative shall be chosen. 
These outside rules seriously disturb any effort to analyze 
c9llective ba1;"gaining agreements according to the elementary 
principles'of contract and agency. Under the principle of majority 
rule dissident members of the appropriate unit lose the power to 
act for themselves, unlike any ordinary principal to an agency 
relation.12 The ·practicalities of group organization deprive even 
a majority of the power to discharge their representative at will; 
although the ordinary agency is always revocable, a bargaining 
tepresentative can be ousted only upon certain occasions.13 The 
agreements executed by the employer with the bargaining repre-
sentative not only fix a man's wages but they may compel him to 
contribute a portion of his earnings to a trust fund,14 compel his 
1149 Stat. 453 (1935), as amended by 61 Stat. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §159(a). 
12 Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944). 
13 Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954). 
14 Coos Bay Lumber Co. v. Local 7-116, International Woodworkers, 203 Ore. 342, 
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retirement15 or change his seniority without his consent.16 In my 
opinion the union may even compromise accrued claims under 
an existing contract, but the point may be doubtful.17 
Efforts have been made to assimilate all these cases to familiar 
contract law by saying that when an employee works in a bargain~ 
ing unit covered by a collective agreement he enters into a volun-
tary contract of hire which incorporates its provisions.18 The words 
can be made to fit, but the formula has the taste of fiction. The 
individual employee may not even know whether the workers are 
represented by a labor union. Probably he does not know many of 
the major terms of the collective bargaining agreement. It may be 
said that this is also true of the farmer who insures his barn or the 
professor who ships his books by railway express, but I submit that 
Justice Stone provided us with a truer insight when he said, 
"Congress has seen fit to clothe the bargaining representative with 
powers comparable to those possessed by a legislative body both to 
create and restrict the rights of those whom it represents."19 
The rules provided by the government to meet the necessities 
of group organization also render many familiar contract rules 
inadequate for the analysis of the employer's contractual rights 
and duties. The point is most clearly illustrated by the problems 
which result whenever it is proposed to change the bargaining 
representative during the term of a collective bargaining agree~ 
ment. 
The opportunity to repudiate an unsatisfactory representative 
and either revert to individual bargaining or substitute another 
agent is a necessary corollary of the principle of freedom of choice. 
Orderly government dictates that the choice be made at intervals. 
279 P. (2d) 508 (1955), rehearing den. 203 Ore. 342, 280 P. (2d) 412 (1955). It may be 
worth noting, however, that the same collective bargaining agreement increased wages 
in an amount equal to the employees' contributions. 
15 Lamon v. Georgia Southern & Fla. R. Co., 212 Ga. 63, 90 S.E. (2d) 658 (1955). 
McMullans v. Kansas, 0. & G. Ry. Co., (10th Cir. 1956) 229 F. (2d) 50. 
16 Walker v. Pennsylvania-Reading Seashore Lines, 142 N.J. Eq. 588, 61 A. {2d) 453 
(1948); Leeder v. Cities' Service Oil Co., 199 Okla. 618, 189 P. (2d) 189 (1948). 
17 Cox, "Individual Enforcement of Collective Bargaining Agreements," 8 LAB. L. J. 
850 (1957). 
18 Assn. of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., (3d Cir. 
1954) 210 F. (2d) 623, affd. on other grounds 348 U.S. 437 (1955). 
19 Steele v. Louisville & N. R. Co., 323 U.S. 192 at 202 (1944). Compare the following 
statement in Justice Murphy's concurring opinion, at 208: "Congress, through the Railway 
Labor Act, has conferred upon the union selected by a majority of a craft or class of 
railway workers the power to represent the entire craft or class in all collective bargaining 
matters. While such a union is essentially a private organization, its power to represent 
and bind all members of a craft or class is derived solely from Congress." 
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An otherwise appropriate occasion for raising the question of 
representation may fall within the term of an unexpired collective 
bargaining agreement which not only confers rights and liabilities 
upon the employees as individuals but also affects them in their 
group capacity because it confers rights and duties upon the incum-
bent union as an organization. One cannot give full effect both 
to the existing contract and to the choice of a new representative, 
i.e., the reformation of the group. The law might put sanctity of 
contract above freedom of choice and reason that the employees 
surrendered· their right to change representatives when, through 
their designated representative, they executed the long term agree-
ment;20 Or it might be said that although the employees may 
~ange their representative, they remain bound by the unexpired 
agreement in all other respects.21 
Apparently this is the teaching of the law of contracts. If A, the 
owner _c:if a house, designates B as his renting agent and B nego-
tiates a five-year lease to C at $200 a month, A may not discharge 
B two years later, substitute D as his agent, and then avoid the 
lease and evict C unless the rent is raised to $250. The lease re-
mains binding between A and C despite the change of agents. 
The law of collective bargaining has not yet crystalized but 
the trend of development is against the analogy. The National 
Labor ·Relations Board took the first step when it held that a 
collective bargaining agreement was not a bar to a representation 
election after a reasonable period.22 The issue was conceived to 
t!:1rn · on striking a balance between the interest in stability and 
~~ values of freedom of choice. At first the bar was for a year. 
Then it was lengthened to two years;23 and now the Board is 
apparently considering a still longer period.24 In establishing the 
rule the Board often protested that its action did not "ipso facto 
20 Triboro Coach Corp. v. New York State Labor Relations Board, 286 N.Y. 314, 
36 N.E. (2d) 315 (1941), points in this direction. See also New England Transportation 
Co., I N.L:R.B. 130 (1936). 
21 In Pacific Greyhound Lines, 22 N.L.R.B. 111 at 145-146 (1940), Member Smith 
suggested ·that a supervening certification "result[s] merely in the termination by opera-
tion of law of the outstanding collective contract or its terms where they conflict with 
action by the certified representative ... , and not in a termination of all substantive 
terms of the contract otherwise valid." In his view the recognition clause and union 
shop provisions fell in the former category, but the "provisions covering wages, hours of 
service, and other working conditions of ·these employees continued in force and were 
binding upon the bus drivers as principals after certification." 
22 The Trailer Co., 51 N.L.R.B. 1106 (1943). 
23 Reed Roller Bit Co., 72 N.L.R.B. 927 (1947). 
24 See 41 LAB. REL. REP. 459 at 462 (1958). 
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set aside the contract, or necessarily affect whatever legal rights 
may have survived the destruction of the union which negotiated 
and signed it.''2;; 
One can hardly appraise the unstabilizing effect of a new elec-
tion without considering its potential impact upon an existing 
collective bargaining agreement. If the new representative simply 
administers the old agreement until it expires by its terms, the 
change in representatives can hardly upset existing arrangements. 
The uncertainties are greater if the employer has a legal duty to 
negotiate changes in the existing agreement. If the contract is 
swept away by the change in representatives, it loses force as a 
stabilizing influence and an upheaval may result. But whether the 
NLRB analysis was disingenuous or simply incomplete, the rule is 
well established. It was a recognized part of our labor relations law 
when Congress made a thorough overhaul of the National Labor 
Relations Act of 194 7 without reversing the doctrine.26 We are left 
to reason out the consequences. 
The first question is whether the employer has a duty to bar-
gain collectively with the new representative about subjects cov-
ered by the contract with the old bargaining agent. In American 
Seating Company21 the Board unanimously held that a refusal to 
bargain under these circumstances would violate section 8(a)(5): 
" ... if a newly chosen representative is to be hobbled in the 
way proposed by the Respondent [i.e., by binding it to the 
old contract], a great part of the benefit to be derived from 
the no-bar rule will be dissipated. There is little point in 
selecting a new bargaining representative which is unable 
to negotiate new terms and conditions of employment for an 
extended period."28 
Member Rogers has indicated a disposition to change the rule, 
and the conservative Republicans occasionally propose its overturn 
by legislation.29 Thus far, however, the American Seating doctrine 
25 E.g., Container Corp., 61 N.L.R.B. 823 at 827 (1945). 
26 Indeed it may be argued that §8(d) implicitly approved the doctrine in its con-
cluding clauses. See note 30 infra. 
27 106 N .L.R.B. 250 (1953). 
28 Id. at 255. 
29 During the consideration of the Kennedy-Ives bill in the Senate there were pro-
posals to overturn the contract bar rule so that elections might be held at any time in 
interests of "union democracy," but to preserve the old contract until it expired by its 
terms in the interest of "stability." The amendments were defeated-I think wisely. The 
NLRB is apparently considering imposing this rule upon unions in cases in which a 
schism removes the normal contract bar to an election. See 41 LAB. REL. REI•. 459 (1958). 
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stands as the latest NLRB ruling and while it has not been sub-
jected to judicial review, one may safely hazard the guess that the 
courts will approve it for reasons stated below.30 
The critical question in comparing ordinary contract law to 
the evolving law of collective bargaining agreements is whether 
any obligations under the existing agreement survive the super-
vening certification. The American Seating doctrine does not 
logically compel an affirmative answer because the employer might 
have a duty to bargain in good faith about proposed changes in 
terms and conditions of employment even though the contract 
remained in force and would continue to govern plant relation-
ships except as changes were mutually agreed. On this question 
the books afford no precedent. 
To make the issue concrete, suppose that an employer and the 
United Automobile Workers execute a four-year contract which 
fixes $2.00 an hour as the wage rate for assembly-line workers 
and $2.75 an hour for maintenance electricians. The contract 
provides pension and insurance benefits financed by matching 
payments of 7½ cents an hour with the employees' share deducted 
from their wages. A "no strike" clause provides, "The union prom-
ises that it will not call or sanction, and on behalf of the 
employees promises that they will not engage in, any strike, slow-
down or other interruption of work during the term of this 
agreement." 
30 See pp. 11-14 infra. There is also room for arguing that NLRA §8(d)(4), 61 Stat. 143 
(1947), 29 U.S.C. (1952) §158(d)(4), implies congressional approval of this conclusion. 
Section 8(d) provides that a bargaining representative which is party to an existing col-
lective agreement shall be deemed guilty of an unfair labor practice unless it gives notice 
of the desire to terminate or modify an existing contract, offers to meet and confer for 
the purpose of negotiating a new contract, and then "continues in full force and effect, 
without resorting to strike or lockout, all the terms and conditions of the existing con-
tract for a period of sixty days after such notice is given or until the expiration date of 
such contract, whichever occurs later." The next sentence provides that the foregoing 
duties "shall become inapplicable upon an intervening certification of the Board, under 
which the labor organization or individual, which is a party to the contract, has been 
superseded as or ceased to be the representative of the employees .... " It is fair inference 
that the new representative is free to bargain and, so far as the NLRA is concerned, free 
to strike uninhibited by the old contract. The sentep.ce also goes on to declare that "the 
duties so imposed shall not be construed as requiring either party to discuss or agree to 
any modification of the terms and conditions contained in a contract for a fixed period, 
if such modification is to become effective before such terms and conditions can be re-
opened under the provisions of the contract." 
Although it does not compel the conclusion, the juxtaposition of these passages sug-
gests that the draftsman assumed that a party would be required to discuss modification 
of the terms and conditions of employment in an existing contract upon the certification 
of a new representative. 
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After two years the International Brotherhood of Electrical 
Workers is certified as the bargaining representative of the main-
tenance electricians. Three ensuing questions deserve consider-
ation. 
(I) What remedies has the employer if the IBEW calls the 
electricians out on strike in support of a demand that their wages 
be raised from the $2.75 fixed in the UAW contract to $3.00 an 
hour? IBEW made no promises to the employer and while the law 
might conceivably compel the new representative to assume all the 
obligations of the old agreement, this hypothesis is inconsistent 
with the rule that it may bargain for new terms of employment. 
The obligations of the employees are less certain, for the UAW 
may well have had the power to bind the electricians as principals 
to obligations not released by the change of agents. If the conven-
tional rules apply, the electricians could therefore be enjoined 
from striking in breach of contract and the IBEW from inducing 
the breach. 
(2) After the certification would the employer be legally free 
to· reduce the electricians' wages to $2.60 an hour-fifteen cents 
below the rate fixed in the UAW contract-as soon as it satisfied 
the duty to bargain with IBEW before taking unilateral action? 
If an electrician thought that he was underpaid, might he sue for 
breach of contract? These questions are not quite the same as the 
first inquiry because the intervening certification might be held 
to give the new bargaining representative an election to accept or 
disaffirm the old contract in the manner of a debtor in a reorgan-
ization proceeding.31 
(3) What becomes of the UAW contract in relation to the 
segments of the old bargaining unit with respect to which UAW 
continues to be the bargaining representative? UAW might argue 
that any change in the electricians' wages or conditions of employ-
ment upsets intraplant relationships which were so basic to the old 
agreement that their disturbance discharges its obligations. 
I am inclined to think that the law will ultimately be that the 
UAW contract is terminated, so far as the electricians are con-
cerned, immediately upon the NLRB determination that the 
electricians have changed their group organization and chosen a 
new representative. There are three reasons for this conclusion. 
First. Many important parts of the UAW contract cannot 
316 COLLIER, BANKRUPTCY, 14th ed. (Moore &: Oglebay) §3.23 (1957). 
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possibly be applied to the electricians without ignoring the NLRB 
certification. The recognition clause is a promise to bargain ex-
clusively with the UAW, which could not be observed after the 
certification without violating section 8(a)(5). It would be highly 
incongruous, although probably not illegal, to continue to require 
electricians to maintain UAW membership as a condition of em-
ployment or to check-off UAW dues. In the Modine Mfg. Co. case 
the Sixth Circuit held that a labor union retains no rights under 
a collective bargaining agreement after it has been superseded as 
the employees' representative.32 
Possibly the parts of a collective bargaining agreement which 
confer rights upon the old representative as an organization can 
be severed while preserving the remainder, 33 but I am inclined 
to think that once the obligations of the union shop, the check-off 
and the recognition clause have been swept away, the other clauses 
fall with them. Many substantive provisions are intertwined with 
the identification of a particular representative. In our hypo-
thetical case there is a promise to make payments into a UAW 
trust fund for providing welfare and pension benefits. Surely the 
electricians would p.ot continue to pay into a trust fund admin-
istered by UAW, yet if those payments were suspended the whole 
question of wages should be reopened, for the suspension would 
alter the burdens and benefits of the entire agreement. 
Second. There are often clauses in a collective bargaining 
agreement which could be lawfully applied after an intervening 
certification but which would scarcely fit the new conditions. This 
is especially true in a case of craft severance. One can hardly 
imagine a small unit of pattern makers handling grievances under 
the complex provisions of the General Motors contract. Seniority 
clauses which were suitable while all the production and mainten-
ance workers were in a single bargaining unit might become highly 
inappropriate after severance. The old union might have been 
equipped to participate in a complicated job evaluation and rating 
plan while the new union commands neither the skill nor the 
interest. 
Third. Employees frequently change representatives because 
they are dissatisfied with existing substantive conditions of employ-
32 Modine Mfg. Co. v. International Assn. of Machinists, (6th Cir. 1954) 216 F. (2d) 
326. 
33 See note 21 supra. 
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ment and not merely with the manner in which their previous 
representative administered the agreement. As a matter of practical 
politics the new union must show that it can render better service 
and this requires making some kind of changes regardless of 
whether they actually benefit or merely seem to benefit the 
employees. Of course it might be argued that once the employees 
have become parties to a contract as principals, their dissatisfaction 
with substantive terms of employment is irrelevant so long as the 
contract endures. The question then becomes whether the law can 
force adherence to the old arrangement and still preserve a sound, 
efficient production unit governed with some measure of industrial 
justice. My only contention is that it is unrealistic to attempt to 
separate the question whether a new election shall be held from 
the question of the continued effectiveness of the old agreement. 
Once it is decided to certify a new representative termination of 
the old agreement is a practical necessity. 
I know of no satisfactory way in which to explain this result in 
terms of normal contract theories. Possibly one could say that 
continued representation of the employees by the union which 
signs the contract is an implied condition of all its obligations 
somewhat as the survival of a particular soloist may be an implied 
condition of a contract for a concert.34 The explanation would 
not suffice, however, if the terms of the collective agreement nega-
tived the implication; and it seems unlikely that the law will 
permit the parties to change the rule by private agreement. 
In a number of cases the NLRB argued that a long term 
contract did not bar an election because it was "of unreasonable 
duration," thereby implying either that the representative had 
exceeded its authority or else that the agreement was against 
public policy.35 Member Reilly elaborated the first alternative 
at some length in a dissenting opinion in Container Corporation,36 
saying in part, "I have always thought . . . that our justification 
rested upon the theory that these were not valid contracts and, 
hence, not a bar to a present redetermination of the bargaining 
representative." 
There are two difficulties with attributing the ineffectiveness 
of the contract to a defect in the agent's authority. First, it does 
84 6 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §1334 (1951). 
35 NLRB SEVENTH ANNUAL 1REPORT 55 (1942). 
36 61 N.L.R.B. 823 at 829 (1945). 
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not explain all the cases. The termination of the contract by a new 
certification after a schism37 or the disintegration of the incumbent 
union38 cannot be explained by any original defect in authority 
of the incumbent unless we are simply to tuck all our conclusions 
into the premise. Second, if the representative lacks authority to 
negotiate a contract for more than a reasonable period, then the 
contract must cease to bind the employer regardless of which union 
wins the election or even if there is no election. The third person 
can take advantage of defects in the authority of an agent as well 
as the principal. 
There is no greater comfort in the suggestion that a contract 
is discharged upon a supervening certification because all contracts 
are subject to changes in domestic law or the exercise of rightful 
governmental authority.39 The problem is not whether the ex-
isting contract excuses observance of a government mandate or 
even whether the government mandate terminates the contract. 
The problem is how are we to explain and fit into a coherent body 
of law the government mandate which permits employees to choose 
new representatives under specified conditions and thus gain re-
lease from a contract which would continue to bind them if the 
representative had not been changed. The only possible explan-
ation which I can see is that the rules necessary to group organiz-
ation and collective bargaining require us frankly to disregard 
some of the. normal rules of contracts and agency and to devise 
special corollaries to the propositions articulated by Congress and 
the National Labor Relations Board as its delegate. 
III 
The ease with which one can show that collective bargaining 
agreements have characteristics which preclude the application of 
some of the familiar principles of contracts and agency creates the 
danger that those who are knowledgeable about collective bar-
gaining will demand that we discard all the precepts of contract 
law and create a new law of collective bargaining agreements. I 
have already expressed the view that the courts would ignore the 
plea but surely it is unwise even if they would sustain it. Many 
legal rules have hardened into conceptual doctrines which lawyers 
37 Brenizer Trucking Co., 44 N.L.R.B. 810 (1942). 
38 Container Corp., 61 N.L.R.B. 823 (1945). 
30 See, e.g., American Seating Co., 106 N.L.R.B. 250 at 254, n. 22 (1953). 
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invoke with little thought for the underlying reasons, but the doc-
trines themselves represent an accumulation of tested wisdom, they 
are bottomed upon notions of fairness and sound public policy, 
and it would be a foolish waste to climb the ladder all over again 
just because the suggested principles were developed in other con-
texts and some of them are demonstrably inapposite. Any careful 
student of contracts would tell us that there are as wide differences 
in the substantive rules and precepts of interpretation applicable 
to different kinds of contracts as there are between what labor 
relations specialists call "ordinary contracts" and collective bar-
gaining agreements. A long term requirements contract poses 
different problems from the sale of Blackacre. A contract to build 
a house is not a contract of marriage. Should not our attitude be 
one of inquiry into the pertinency of the reasons for each contract 
rule? Some contract rules stand up well in the new environment as 
I shall endeavor to show in this portion of my paper. They appear 
to be those which derive from functional aspects of commercial 
contracts that are also important characteristics of collective bar-
gaining agreements. The doctrine of failure of consideration 
and the element of "bargain" or "exchange" furnish a prime 
illustration. 
The idea of "exchange" lies behind a substantial part of the 
law of contracts. Section 266 of the Restatement of Contracts states 
that, with two immaterial exceptions, "In all bilateral contracts 
where the only consideration on each side consists of promises, all 
the promises on one side taken collectively and all the promises on 
the other side taken collectively are promises for an agreed 
exchange: . . . " 
The importance of the rule is that it makes the duties of the 
contracting parties mutually dependent. Section 274 states, "In 
promises for an agreed exchange, any material failure of perform-
ance by one party not justified by the conduct of the other dis-
charges the latter's duty to give the agreed exchange even though 
his promise is not in terms conditional. An immaterial failure does 
not operate as such a discharge." 
Since a collective bargaining agreement has a strong element 
of exchange, there would seem to be no a priori reason not to 
follow these doctrines whenever there is a breach. Surely the notion 
that it is unjust to require a person to perform his promise when 
he will not receive the agreed exchange is as applicable to manage-
ment and labor as it is to commercial enterprises. There will be 
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differences, to be sure, in the way the rule works out, as I shall show 
in a moment, but the differences can be worked out in determining 
when the failure of consideration is "material." 
The application of ordinary contract principles would have 
avoided the creation of ill-starred precedent in the Mastro Plastics 
case.40 During the term of a collective bargaining agreement with 
the United Brotherhood of Carpenters, Mastro Plastics Corpor-
ation engaged in a vigorous campaign of unfair labor practices 
designed to oust the Carpenters as bargaining representative in 
favor of another union. The campaign reached a climax with the 
discharge of Ciccone, a vigorous adherent of the Carpenters. The 
employees struck in protest. Mastro discharged the strikers, who 
later sought reinstatement by the NLRB on the ground that the 
strike was caused by unfair labor practices. One defense was that 
the strike violated a clause in an unexpired collective bargaining 
agreement by which the union agreed "to refrain from engaging in 
any strike or work stoppage during the term of this agreement." 
The NLRB overruled this defense on the ground that the "no 
strike" clause was to be interpreted as coextensive with the arbi-
tration clause, which covered "differences ... as to the meaning and 
application of this agreement .... "41 The court of appeals sustained 
the Board, saying: 
"The right of employees to strike in resistance to unfair 
labor practices by an employer is a fundamental one which the 
statute recognizes and no contractual waiver of that right is to 
be inferred from general provisions in a collective bargaining 
contract which do not make it clear that strikes caused by the 
employer's unfair labor practices were included in the 
prohibition. "42 
The Supreme Court held that "the contract did not waive the 
employees' right to strike solely against the unfair labor practices 
of their employers."43 Even the dissenting justices agreed with this 
conclusion. 
Such unanimity should forestall criticism, but I submit that 
the judicial interpretation of the undertaking "to refrain from 
40 Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956), affirming (2d Cir. 1954) 214 
F. (2d) 462, which enforced 103 N.L.R.B. 511 (1953). 
41103 N.L.R.B. 511 at 514-515 (1953). 
42 (2d Cir. 1954) 214 F. (2d) 462 at 464-465. 
43 350 U.S. 270 at 284 (1956). 
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engaging in any strike or work stoppage during the term of this 
agreement" both violates the plain and inherently sensible 
meaning of the words and also threatens normal collective bar-
gaining practices. In discharge cases the claim is often made that 
the supervisor was motivated by distaste for the employee's activi-
ties in pressing grievances or otherwise assisting the union. Man-
agement is not infrequently charged with taking unilateral action 
in violation of a contract and presumably the unilateral action is 
also an unfair labor practice. I had always supposed, and I think 
that both companies and unions have usually supposed, that to call 
a strike by reason of isolated discriminatory discharges or unwar-
ranted bits of unilateral action would violate a typical "no strike" 
provision. I still think that this attitude is the only one consistent 
with sound labor-management relations. The Supreme Court's 
approach, however, rejects this view for it leaves no room for 
distinctions based upon the seriousness of the employer's unfair 
labor practice. Surely a promise not to call "any strike or work 
stoppage" cannot be interpreted to cover strikes against little 
unfair labor practices but not against big ones. 
The application of familiar contract principles would have 
led to the same result without distorting the words or creating the 
embarrassing precedent. By executing the collective bargaining 
agreement Mastro impliedly promised not to engage in conduct 
attacking the existence or representative status of the Carpenters 
Union. The words of a contract do not express all its obligations. 
It is an ancient principle that, "where a party stipulates that an-
other shall do a certain thing, he thereby impliedly promises that 
he will himself do nothing which will hinder or obstruct the other 
in doing that thing."44 Surely a gross attack upon the existence of 
a labor union increases the difficulty of performing its contract 
obligations. Williston tells us that there is also in every contract 
"an implied covenant that neither party shall do anything which 
will have the effect of destroying or injuring the right of the other 
party to receive the fruits of the contract; in other words, in every 
contract there exists an implied covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing."45 A successful attack upon the status of the collective 
bargaining representative obviously deprives it of the fruits which 
44 Gay v. Blanchard, 32 La. Ann. 497 at 504 (1880). See also CONTRACTS REsrATEMENT 
§315(l) (1932). 
45 3 WILLISTON, CoNTRAcrs, rev. ed., §670 (1936). 
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it expects to receive from the collective bargaining agreement. 
Under the doctrine that a material failure of consideration dis-
charges the promise, the Carpenters Union was excused fr~m 
performance of the "no strike" clause if Mastro's breach of its 
implied obligations was material. The unfair labor practices were 
numerous. They were part of a deliberate campaign to introduce 
another union as bargaining representative. Therefore the breach 
was undeniably material. 
Analysis in terms of familiar contract principles thus not only 
sustains the result in the Mastro Plastics case but it also provides 
a more useful technique for future cases. A single discriminatory 
discharge or bit of unilateral action would not be a material breach 
and would not excuse counter-performance. More serious unfair 
labor practices would be material. Rules have been stated for deter-
mining materiality but in the end the test is whether it will "be 
more conformable to justice in the particular case to free the 
injured party [i.e., the union], or, on the other hand, to require 
him to perform his promise, in both cases giving him a right of 
action if the [company's] failure to perform was wTongful."46 
Although the element of "exchange" makes the doctrines of 
dependent convenants and failure of consideration applicable to a 
collective agreement, some of its other qualities should affect the 
manner of their application. A collective bargaining contract is 
made to be broken. The number of people involved, both as 
employees and as supervisors, makes large and small violations 
inevitable. This is one reason for the grievance procedure and 
arbitration. Collective agreements are negotiated for substantial 
periods after much travail. There are enormous pressures to reach 
agreement. There will be no rules to govern the enterprise if the 
contract is set aside. These are proper factors to evaluate in deter-
mining whether a breach is material. They argue for continuing 
the contract and leaving the injured party to his legal or contrac-
tual remedies. Consequently, I am skeptical of the trend toward 
holding that a strike in breach of contract automatically gives the 
employer the right to terminate the agreement.47 There would 
seem to be room for judgment based upon the length of the strike, 
46 CONTRACTS REsrATEMENT §275, comment a (1932). 
47 E.g., Marathon Electric Mfg. Co., 106 NL.R.B. 1171 (1953), affd. (D.C. Cir. 1955) 
223 F. (2d) 338; Boeing Airplane Co. v. Aeronautical Lodge No. 751, I.A.M., (9th Cir. 
1951) 188 F. (2d) 356, affirming (W.D. Wash. 1950) 91 F. Supp. 596. 
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the number of employees affected, the injury to the employer, the 
degree of fault upon the part of the union, and the likelihood that 
the contract will be honored for the remainder of its term. Perhaps 
the line will ultimately be drawn between a more or less spon-
taneous uprising and a planned resort to economic pressure 
sanctioned by union officials in the deliberate disregard of their 
written obligation. In any event the judicial fault, if there is any, 
is one of judgment and not in choosing the conventional contract 
method of analysis. 
IV 
There are rules applicable to "common" or "commercial" 
contracts which can be helpful in resolving cases arising under 
collective bargaining agreements because they furnish the con-
ceptual tools of analysis even though the ultimate answer turns 
less on the concepts than on evaluation of the functional aspects 
of the agreement. This point is illustrated by the question whether 
the union or the individual employee is the proper party to 
sue to enforce, or to settle, a claim under a collective bargaining 
agreement. 
One early conceptual view was that although a collective 
bargaining agreement gave no rights to individual workers, when-
ever a man went to work his individual contract incorporated the 
union agreement as a local custom or usage so that every failure 
to pay wages in accordance with the collective agreement was a 
breach of the individual contract of employment.48 Of course the 
parties to an ordinary commercial contract may stipulate that their 
agreement does not include local usages but this difficulty was 
surmounted by saying that under the Railway Labor and National 
Labor Relations Acts the collective agreement is included in each 
individual's contract of employment by force of law somewhat 
as a carrier's tariff or the statutory provisions of an insurance 
policy.40 Under this view, which was adopted by the Court of 
Appeals for the Third Circuit50 and followed by Justice Reed in 
the Westinghouse case,51 the legal relation between the employer, 
48 E.g., Hudson v. Cincinnati, N. 0. &: T. P. Ry. Co., 152 Ky. 711, 154 S.W. 47 (1913). 
40 J. I. Case Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 at 334-335 (1944). 
50 Assn. of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., (3d 
Cir. 1954) 210 F. (2d) 623. 
51Assn. of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 348 
U.S. 437 at 464 (1955). 
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the union and the employees is conceived as two bilateral con-
tracts. One contract-between the employer and the union-is 
made up partly of promises running to the benefit of the union 
as an organization, like the check-off or closed shop clauses, which 
the union alone can enforce, 52 and partly of provisions relating to 
wages, hours and job security which the employer promises to in-
corporate in a second bilateral contract-the contract of hire be-
tween the employer and the individual employees. Under this 
theory the union may sue for breach of the first contract but since 
it is not a party to the second contract, only the individual may sue 
for the breach of promises running to his benefit. And since the 
claim for compensation is the individual's it must follow that the 
union has no power to make a binding settlement. 
A second theory holds that a collective bargaining agreement 
is a third-party contract with the employer as promisor, the union 
as promisee, and the employees as third-party beneficiaries.53 In 
the Westinghouse case Circuit Judge Staley argued that this de-
scription does not fit the facts because such promises as the union 
shop and check-off do not benefit individual workers,54 but surely 
some of the promises in an instrument may run to the benefit of 
third parties while others benefit the promisee alone. The other 
objection to the third-party beneficiary theory-that the individ-
ual's labor is the sole consideration for the obligation to pay wages 
-is hardly an accurate description of the facts. In negotiating a col-
lective agreement the employer promises a given wage scale as part 
of a package deal in return for various undertakings by the union 
including the promise not to strike, and it is rather unlikely that he 
would have agreed to the same wage scale without the union's 
promises. The individual's furnishing labor is consideration, but 
not the only consideration, for the employer's promise to pay. Un-
der this theory either the union or the employee may sue for 
breach of the promises inuring to the benefit of individual work-
ers. 55 When the individual sues, judgment may be entered for the 
amount due him. When the union sues, the decree may be for spe-
52 MacKay v. Loew's, Inc., (9th Cir. 1950) 182 F. (2d) 170, cert. den. 340 U.S. 828 
(1950); Volquardsen v. Southern Amusement Co., (La. App. 1934) 156 S. 678. 
53 E.g., Leahy v. Smith, 137 Cal. App. (2d) 884, 290 P. (2d) 679 (1955). 
54Assn. of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., (3d 
Cir. 1954) 210 F. (2d) 623 at 628. 
55 Heins v. Byers, 174 Minn. 350, 219 N.W. 287 (1928) (creditor beneficiary); Croker 
v. New York Trust Co., 245 N.Y. 17, 156 N.E. 81 (1927) (donee beneficiary); CONTRACTS 
REsTATEl\lENT §§135, 345 (1932). 
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cific performance or the company can be required to pay the 
money into the registry of court for distribution to individual 
workers in supplementary proceedings.56 In a suit by either an in-
dividual or the union alone, the judgment would not bind the ab-
sent party but the employer could protect himself against a second 
suit by impleading the absent party. 
Third, the legal situation under a collective bargaining agree-
ment may be somewhat loosely compared to a trust with a chose 
in action as the res. In this view the bargaining representative, 
which is subject to fiduciary obligations,57 holds the employer's 
promises in trust for the benefit of the individuals. The trust is a 
common legal device for handling situations in which a single 
obligee is empowered to play a continuing role in the administra-
tion of contracts intended for the benefit of a large and ever chang-
ing group of beneficiaries who may have divergent interests. Massa-
chusetts business trusts and mortgage indentures furnish familiar 
illustrations. According to this analogy the union would ordinarily 
be the only proper party to bring an action for breach of the collec-
tive agreement and the judgment would bind the individuals.58 
The union can enter into binding settlements with the employer.59 
The individual's remedy is to show that the union's handling of 
the claim did not meet its fiduciary obligations.60 In the latter case 
the individual could sue the union to compel it-to perform its du-
ties or he could join the union and the company as co-defendants 
and seek a judgment for the money alleged to be due him.61 
Such theories are highly useful in determining rights and reme-
dies under collective bargaining agreements. They furnish tools of 
analysis. They help us to perceive the implications of particular is-
sues-to see the relation between problems-so that we may achieve 
consistency and integrity instead of an illogical mass of ad hoc 
decisions. They remind us of the flexibility and adaptability of the 
common law. They become dangerous only when artificially se-
lected concepts are allowed to dictate the decision. Any of the three 
theories is a sound abstraction. In the final analysis one must deal 
56 See cases cited note 55 supra. 
57 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §1088 at p. 407 (1951). 
58 TRUSTS REsTATEMENT §§280-282 (1935); 2 Scorr, TRUSTS §§280-282 (1939). 
59 JUDGMENTS RE5TATEMENT §85 (1942). 
60 TRUSTS REsTATEMENT §§192, 322 (1935); 2 Scorr, TRUSTS §192 (1939); 3 Scorr, 
TRUSTS §322 (1939). 
61 Cases dealing with the remedy for breach of the duty of fair representation are 
collected in Cox, "The Duty of Fair Representation," 2 VILLANOVA L. ,REv. 151 at 175-177 
(1957). 
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with the underlying questions of policy which make one theory 
more appropriate than another. Logic cannot replace wisdom. 
Thus we are led back to consideration of the functional nature 
of a collective bargaining agreement. What are its purposes? What 
does it do? What legal conclusioJJ.s about the right to enforce and 
settle claims against the employer result in better performance of 
the functions of the agreement? 
In the community of the shop the collective bargaining agree-
ment serves a function fairly comparable to the role of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act or National Labor Relations Act in the 
whole community. It is an instrument of government as well as an 
instrument of exchange. The point is highly important both in 
evolving substantive law and, as I shall seek to show later, in mat-
ters of interpretation. 
The governmental nature of a collective bargaining agreement 
results partly from the number of people affected and the diversity 
of their interests. Harry Shulman aptly suggested other determin-
ing conditions: 
"[The collective bargaining agreement] is not the typical offer 
and acceptance which normally is the basis for classroom or 
text discussions of contract law. It is not an undertaking to 
produce a specific result; indeed, it rarely speaks of the ulti-
mate product. It is not made by parties who seek each other 
out to make a bargain from scratch and then go his own way. 
The parties to a collective agreement ... meet in their con-
tract negotiations to fix the terms and conditions of their col-
laboration for the future." 62 
Perhaps "collaboration" is too optimistic a word. Perhaps there is 
a "typical" contract only in the sense that economists have a model. 
The point which Shulman caught and I am seeking to emphasize 
is that the collective agreement governs complex, many-sided re-
lations between large numbers of people in a going concern for 
very substantial periods of time. "The trade agreement thus be-
comes, as it were, the industrial constitution of the enterprise set-
ting forth the broad general principles upon which the relation-
ship of employer and employee is to be conducted."63 
There are important differences of opinion as to the scope of 
62 The quotation is from a mimeographed address entitled "The Role of Arbitration 
in the Collective Bargaining Process" which is used in courses in the Harvard Trade 
Union Program. I believe that it must have been delivered at a meeting of the National 
Academy of Arbitrators, but apparently it has not been published. 
63 NLRB v. Highland Park Mfg. Co., (4th Cir. 1940) 110 F. (2d) 632 at 638. 
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collective bargaining agreements. Sometimes they are viewed as 
tightly drawn concessions covering only specifically designated 
portions of the broad range of interests which both management 
and workers have in the conduct of the enterprise, leaving the man-
agers to govern the rest. Others insist that collective agreements es-
tablish a framework for all matters of common interest. I shall 
comment on this issue later. Here I wish to emphasize only the 
breadth and variety of the subject matter covered under even the 
narrowest conception of a labor agreement. Furthermore, since it 
also operates prospectively over a long period, a labor agreement 
must provide for countless unforeseeable contingencies. 
One consequence is that many provisions of the labor agree-
ment must be expressed in general and flexible terms. The con-
cept of "just cause" is an obvious illustration. Sometimes it is not 
possible to do more than establish an appropriate set of procedures 
for resolving certain issues; witness the provisions for fixing work 
loads and piece rates in many of the textile contracts. A collective 
agreement rarely expresses all the rights and duties falling within 
its scope. One simply cannot spell out every detail of life in an 
industrial establishment, or even of that portion which both 
management and labor agree is a matter of mutual concern. 
It is largely for these reasons that collective bargaining agree-
ments provide their own administrative or judicial machinery. Of 
course arbitration long antedates collective bargaining and there 
are thousands of commercial contracts and construction contracts 
under which arbitration is a daily occurrence. Sometimes, as in a 
large scale government construction contract, the functions of the 
"arbitrator" may resemble his functions under a labor agreement. 
By and large, however, there is this distinct difference: the com-
mercial arbitrator finds facts-did the cloth meet the sample-
while the labor arbitrator necessarily pours meaning into the gen-
eral phrases and interstices of a document written somewhat in 
the generalities· of basic regulatory legislation. Furthermore, be-
cause management and employees are involved in continuing re-
lationships, it is at least possible for the arbitrator's rulings to be-
come a body of subordinate rules for the future conduct of the 
enterprise. I say "subordinate rules" because the contract may 
change them. They are rather like the judge-made law-the rubrics 
which the judges put upon statutes, the precepts which govern 
where the statute is silent, the context into which new bits of stat-
utory law will be intruded. 
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Of course this body of shop law is not made up exclusively or 
even largely of arbitration decisions. "The parties to a collective 
agreement start in a going enterprise with a store of amorphous 
methods, attitudes, fears and problems."64 The agreement "is based 
upon a mass of unstated assumptions and practices as to which the 
understanding of the parties may actually differ."65 The assump-
tions and practices which have prevailed in the past and as they de-
velop in the future are not only the background of the agreement 
but the flesh and blood which gives it meaning. 
Individual workers would receive the most protection against 
arbitrary treatment under the theory that the provisions of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement relating to wages and hours become 
effective by incorporation into bilateral contracts of hire between 
the employer and each employee. On the other hand it seems to 
me that giving the union control over all claims arising under the 
collective agreement comports so much better wi~ the functional 
nature of a collective bargaining agreement as to make the third 
legal theory the most satisfactory. Allowing an individual to carry 
a claim to arbitration whenever he is dissatisfied with the adjust-
ment worked out by the company and the union treats issues which 
arise in the administration of a contract as if there were always a 
"right" interpretation to be divined from the instrument. It dis-
courages the kind of day-to-day cooperation between company and 
union which is normally the mark of sound industrial relations-
a relationship in which grievances are treated as problems to be 
solved and contract clauses are only guideposts in a dynamic hu-
man relationship. When the interests of several groups conflict, 
or future needs run contrary to present desires, or when the 
individual's claim endangers group interests, the union's function 
is to resolve the competition by reaching an accommodation or 
striking a balance. The process is political. It involves a melange 
of power, numerical strength, mutual aid, reason, prejudice, and 
emotion. Limits must be placed on the authority of the group, 66 
but within the zone of fairness and rationality this method of self-
government probably works better than the edicts of any outside 
arbiter. 
There are other considerations to be evaluated in resolving 
64 Note 62 supra. 
65 Ibid. 
66 The limits should be imposed under the duty of fair representation. See Cox, 
"The Duty of Fair Representation,'' 2 VILLANOVA L. R.Ev. 151 (1957). 
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this issue.67 The only point upon which I wish to insist is the 
relevance of the governmental aspects of the collective bargaining 
agreement in deciding who may assert and compromise claims for 
its violation. I dwell upon them partly for this reason and partly 
because they also lead to problems of contract interpretation with 
which I shall close this paper. 
V 
The governmental nature of a collective bargaining agreement 
should have predominant influence in its interpretation. The 
generalities, the deliberate ambiguities, the gaps, the unforeseen 
contingencies, the need for a rule although the agreement is silent 
-all require a creativeness quite unlike the attitude of one con-
struing a deed or a promissory note or a three-hundred page cor-
porate trust indenture. Perhaps the requisite attitude can be sug-
gested by likening the interpretation of a collective agreement to 
the construction of a basic statute creating an administrative 
agency, although the analogy may assume too readily that the 
"look-in-dictionary" school of statutory interpretation has given 
way to willingness to read basic statutes "not as theorems of Euclid 
but with some imagination of the purposes which lie behind 
th "68 em. 
The interpretation of a statute is the proliferation of a purpose. 
In a sense it is misleading to speak of the legislative intent. No 
one supposes that the tens of senators and hundreds of representa-
tives who vote for a bill have one common state of mind. I trust, 
also, that arbitrators who speak of "the intent of the parties" do 
not mean to imply that they are concerned with the secret, un-
expressed intent of either party. Those who listen seriously to the 
testimony of negotiators concerning what they understood or 
supposed or intended run the risk of imposing upon one side the 
unilateral suppositions of the other. The true standard of inter-
pretation must be objective.69 To speak of intent as if the congress-
men or negotiators had reached a conclusion upon the specific 
issue is also misleading. The troublesome issues during the ad-
ministration of a statute or contract are usually those which the 
67 Cox, "Rights Under a Labor Agreement," 69 HARv. L. REv. 601 (1956); Cox, 
"Individual Enforcement of Collective Bargaining Agreements," 8 LAB. L. J. 850 (1957). 
68 Lehigh Valley Coal Co. v. Yensavage, (2d Cir. 1914) 218 F. 547 at 553, cert. den. 
235 U.S. 705 (1915). 
69 CONTRACTS R.E5TATEMENT §20 (1932). 
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authors either refused to face or failed to anticipate. Yet to speak 
of intent, when the word is properly understood, serves two use-
ful functions. It reminds the interpreter that the statute or contract 
is a purposive instrument. The metaphor also cautions the inter-
preter that it is his duty to effectuate the will of the Congress-
or of the parties to the contract-even though he himself might 
reach an infinitely wiser decision. What the interpreter must 
strive to do, therefore, is to give the instrument the application 
which the author would have provided if he had consciously de-
termined the issue.70 
In the case of a statute the best guide to this meaning is its 
policy or purpose. Behind the words there usually lies a general 
aim, an objective, which embodies specific meanings, half-under-
stood, half-unarticulated; and by these one may judge specific 
cases. 
"Life overflows its molds and the will outstrips its own univer-
sals. Men cannot know their own meaning till the variety of 
its manifestations is disclosed in its final impacts and the full 
content of no design is grasped till it has got beyond its gen-
eral formulation and become differentiated in its last in-
cidence. It should be, and it may be, the function of the 
profession to manifest such purposes in their completeness 
if it can achieve the genuine loyalty which comes not from 
obedience, but from the according will, for interpretation is 
a mode of the will and understanding is a choice."71 
Many questions of interpretation can be handled in this fash-
ion under collective bargaining agreements. The most ambiguous 
phrase may be directed to a practical problem, and it is an obvious 
mistake to read the words without attention to the problem. 
Because the problems are usually unfamiliar and are often subtle, 
70 As good an illustration as any is NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111 
(1944). The issue was whether newsboys could properly be found to ,be "employees" 
within the National Labor Relations Act despite the employer's want of control over 
the manner in which the work was done. According to the conventional common law 
view there is no employment relation unless the putative employer enjoys a right of 
control. The NLRB argued for a broader standard which would determine the applicabil• 
ity of the statute in doubtful situations by the underlying economic facts showing whether 
the particular workers were subject to evils the statute was intended to eradicate and 
whether the remedies were appropriate rather than by technical, previously established 
legal classifications. The Supreme Court observed that the Wagner Act sometimes adopted 
and sometimes rejected established legal classifications. In choosing between the alterna-
tives the Court inquired which interpretation I\Vas the more consistent with the fundamen-
tal purposes of the act, and therefore rejected the conventional, common law definition. 
71 Hand, "The Speech of Justice," 29 HAR.v. L. REv. 617 at 620 (1916). 
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counsel may find it hard to persuade the judge to read the provi-
sions of a labor contract "not as theorems of Euclid, but with 
some imagination of the purposes which lie behind them." It may 
sometimes be extraordinarily difficult to convey a sense of purpose 
through testimony, briefs and oral argument; but these are all 
familiar tasks of advocacy which hardly affect the nature of the 
issues. 
Unfortunately, many of the most important questions of in-
terpretation are not soluble by reference to the fundamental 
purposes of the collective agreement-at least not in the sense in 
which that term is usually understood. The difficulty arises from 
the fact that management and labor often have conflicting aims 
and objectives, and the interpretation put upon the contract may 
depend upon which objective is chosen as the major premise. The 
point is illustrated by a dispute which I heard as arbitrator some 
years ago over the meaning of a clause in the grievance procedure. 
The clause stipulated that a grievance which could not be settled 
with the foreman should be taken up in a second step-"Between 
the Shop Committee (including the steward in the department 
where the grievance originated) and the Division Superintendent." 
The contract was executed after a long strike which almost 
wiped out the local union. The International took the president 
of the local out of the plant in an effort to rebuild and put her on 
a full-time salary with the sole task of serving the employees in 
the mill in question. As an employee she had been on the shop 
committee. TWUA wished her to continue to be present at the 
second step of the grievance procedure. The company objected on 
the ground that one who was not an employee could not be a 
member of the "shop committee." There is some force to the 
verbal argument but it can be countered with the contention that 
the clause should not be taken as an exclusive list of the persons 
who might participate because this interpretation would exclude 
everyone on the company's side except the division superintendent. 
Verbally the case was a stand-off. The president of the local union 
had some familiarity with the ways of collective bargaining; she 
was self-possessed, quick and articulate. The employees on the 
shop committee were unusually inexperienced and inarticulate. 
If one started from the premise that the grievance procedure was 
intended to be a forum in which both sides of a question should 
be presented effectively in the hope of reaching a reasoned deci-
sion, the local president should be allowed to attend with, or as 
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a member of, the shop committee. The third and fourth steps 
would be handled by officials of the International Union. I assume 
that this was roughly the purpose which the union attributed to 
the grievance procedure. The employer's reputation was strongly 
anti-union. At this particular mill, one of its few unionized plants, 
the union had almost disintegrated because of the strike. It seems 
realistic to suppose that the company hoped that the union's ad-
ministration of the contract would be so inefficient and inept that 
the employees would lose interest. From this premise one would 
logically come to the view that Step 2 should be narrowly in-
terpreted in order to keep the union ineffective. Thus the issue 
really turned upon whether one took the union's purpose or the 
company's purpose as the guiding premise. I ruled for the union72 
and would do so again, but candor compels me to recognize that 
this conception of the collective bargain as an instrument intended 
to operate effectively was imposed upon the parties from outside 
in defiance of the employer's intent, which must have been known 
to the union, because the arbitrator chose to be guided by the 
national labor policy or perhaps by a personal predilection for 
effective union participation. 
Although the preceding illustration may seem unimportant, 
the type of conflict which it illustrates lies at the bottom of many 
of the toughest problems of interpretation. Let me use two com-
mon examples, one involving discharge and the other subcontract-
ing, in order to bring out the difficulty. 
Suppose that an employee is discharged for what the union 
thinks is insufficient cause during the term of a collective bargain-
ing agreement which contains most of the customary provisions, 
including recognition, seniority, grievance, and arbitration clauses 
but which imposes no express limitation upon the management's 
power to discharge. Of course the exact words of the contract make 
a difference but one reading the opinions gets the feeling that it 
is not the language which leads courts to deny relief while arbitra-
tors examine the merits of the discharge.73 In Coca-Cola Bottling 
72 Textile Workers Union and Ludlow Mfg. Co., reprinted in Cox, CAsES ON LABOR 
LAw, 4th ed., 650 (1958). 
73 Compare United Furniture Workers of America v. Little Rock Furniture Mfg. 
Co., (E.D. Ark. 1957) 148 F. Supp. 129; Held v. American Linen Supply Co., 6 Utah (2d) 
106, 307 P. (2d) 210 (1957), with Coca-Cola Bottling Co., reprinted in Cox, CASES ON 
LABoR LAw, 4th ed., 583 (1958). Atwater Mfg. Co., 13 Lab. Arb. Rep. 747 (1949); Pilot 
Freight Carriers, Inc., 22 Lab. Arb. Rep. 761 (1954). But see Okenite Co., 22 Lab. Arb. 
Rep. 756 (1954). 
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Co. of Boston Saul Wallen reasoned that" ... the meaning of the 
contract, when viewed as a whole, is that a limitation on the 
employer's right to discharge was created with the birth of the 
instrument. Both the necessity for maintaining the integrity of 
the contract's component parts and the very nature of collective 
bargaining agreements are the basis for this conclusion."74 
There is little force to the argument that the implication of 
a clause limiting discharges to cases of just cause is necessary to 
preserve the integrity of a seniority clause or grievance procedure. 
The integrity of the seniority and grievance clauses would not be 
affected by the arbitrary and capricious discharge of a junior em-
ployee who had no grievance. 
Mr. Wallen's reliance upon "the very nature of collective 
bargaining agreements" cuts much deeper. He thereby asserts 
that a company which signs a collective bargaining agreement 
automatically assumes some obligations and submits certain man-
agement actions to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator even though 
the agreement says nothing about them. The dissenting member 
of the arbitration board spoke the truth when he protested _that 
the majority "have taken a contract which contained no language 
which could possibly be construed as a limitation on the Com-
pany's right of discharge and have implied a very stringent limita-
tion on that right,"75 but this assertion did not meet the basic con-
tention that employees had rights cognizable by the arbitrator in 
addition to those which the contract expressly gave them. 
Some of the subcontracting cases which have been so much 
debated in recent years raise the same kind of issues although 
others may turn upon narrower reasoning. Suppose that a man-
ufacturer of heavy steam valves is a party to a contract which makes 
no mention of subcontracting but contains, in addition to the 
arbitration clause, such customary provisions as a recognition 
clause, a seniority clause, a discharge clause and a schedule of 
wage rates. The manufacturer sublets the machining of certain 
parts to an independent concern instead of following his previously 
unbroken practice of doing all his own production. There are 
layoffs and a reduction of overtime. The union protests that the 
contract has been violated and takes the case to arbitration. There 
74 Coca-Cola Bottling Co., reprinted in Cox, CAsES ON LABoR I.Aw, 4th ed., 583 at 586 
(1958). 
75 Id. at 590. 
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is precedent for the view that subcontracting is a reserved right 
of management.76 There are also decisions upholding the union's 
.contention on grounds reminiscent of Mr. Wallen's reasoning in 
· the Coca-Cola case: 
" ... the Recognition clause, where considered together with 
the Wage clause, the Seniority clauses, and other clauses 
establishing standards for covered jobs and employees limits 
the Company's right to subcontract during the term of the 
Contract ... To allow the Company, ... to lay off the em-
ployees and transfer. the work to employees not covered by 
the agreed standards would subvert the contract and destroy 
the meaning of the collective bargaining relation."77 
I suggested earlier that the collective bargaining agreement, 
unlike most other contracts, is an instrument of government be-
cause it regulates diverse affairs of many people with conflicting 
interests over a substantial period of time. One can phrase the basic 
problem of interpretation in the discharge and subcontracting cases 
by saying that the parties differ with respect to the kind of govern-
ment which they propose to establish. Is it a monarchy except 
insofar as the employer has assumed the obligations explicitly 
stated or fairly implied from the contract? Or has the whole realm 
of matters of mutual concern to employer and employees been 
brought within the joint authority of the company and union 
,under a regime in which the legislative process is performed in 
annual contract negotiations and the executive and judicial process 
is carried out under a grievance procedure ending in arbitration? 
Usually the realm of matters of mutual concern is divided, part 
to be regulated by the employer and part to be governed by joint 
authority under the regime established by the contract. The issue 
·then becomes, which matters are regulated by one form of govern-
ment and which by the other. Did the Coca-Cola contract move 
discharges into the area of collective bargaining, i.e., of joint 
responsibility, or were they left to the sole responsibility of man-
76 Amalgamated Assn. of Street Electric Railway Employees v. The Greyhound Corp., 
(5th Cir. 1956) 231 F. (2d) 585; International Longshoremen's Union v. Inland Waterways 
'Corp., 213 La. 670, 35 S. (2d) 425 (1948); Anno. 57 AL.R. (2d) 1399 (1958). Cf. Amal-
gamated Assn. of Street Electric Railway and Motor Coach Employees v. Eastern Mass. 
Street Ry. Co., (D.C. Mass. 1958) 162 F. Supp. 942. For illustrative arbitration rulings, 
see Hercules Powder Co., 21 Lab. Arb. Rep. 330 (1953); Allegheny Ludlum Steel Corp., 
23 Lab. Arb. Rep. 171 (1954). 
77 A. D. Juilliard Co., 21 Lab. Arb. Rep. 713 at 724 (1953). See also Celanese Corp., 
14 Lab. Arb. Rep. 31 (1950); Stockholders Publ. Corp., 16 Lab. Arb. Rep. 644 (1951). 
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agement? What about subcontracting? It is to the basic conflict over 
the size of the area subject to joint responsibility that I refer when 
I speak of the lack of a common purpose on the part of both man-
agement and labor to which questions of interpretation can be 
referred. Going a step further, I suggest that this is the very essence 
of large parts of a collective bargaining agreement-it has the 
nature of an armed truce in a continuing struggle, yet the armistice 
line has not been put on a map. 
Before discussing the significance of this highly tentative con-
clusion I should like to insist upon two distinctions. First, I sub-
mit that problems of the kind illustrated by the discharge and 
subcontracting cases will sometimes yield to analysis in terms of 
familiar contract principles. The notion that ordinary commercial 
contracts spell out all their obligations is a silly canard. Every 
contract, whether a typical commercial contract or a labor agree-
ment contains "an implied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing."78 One who sells a retail milk business impliedly promises 
that he will not solicit former customers. 79 A lease of coal lands in 
exchange for a schedule of royalties implies an obligation to mine 
the coal diligently.80 Under the Coca-Cola-type contract there 
should be no hesitation in setting aside a discharge aimed at cir-
cumventing seniority or defeating a grievance even though the 
contract says nothing about discharges because such a discharge 
destroys the right of the employees to have the fruits of their 
bargain. Upon this familiar principle of contracts one might 
fairly conclude in the absence of other evidence that the provisions 
of a collective bargaining agreement establishing wages and labor 
standards imply an obligation not to seek a substitute labor sup-
ply at lower wages or inferior standards. The implied promise 
would prohibit subcontracting for this purpose. But there are 
limitations to the covenant of honesty and fair dealing. A man-
ufacturer who sells goods when the price is high is not precluded 
from doubling his output because this would impair the value of 
the buyer's purchase. A collective bargaining agreement does not 
imply a promise that the employer will not deprive the union and 
the employees of its benefits by closing an obsolete plant or drop-
ping an unprofitable line of business. Similarly, the implied 
78 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS, rev. ed., §670 (1936). 
79 Cf. Colton v. Duval, 254 Mich. 346, 237 N.W. 48 (1931). 
so Mendota Coal & Coke Co. v. Eastern Ry. & Lumber Co., (9th Cir. 1931) 53 F. (2d) 77. 
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covenant of good faith and fair dealing can hardly be supposed 
to reach subcontracting which is based upon business considera-
tions other than the cost of acquiring labor under the collective 
agreement. In such a case either management is free to act or some 
limitation must be found in the very nature of a collective bar-
gaining agreement. · 
The second distinction which I wish to press is a differentiation 
between (I) implying obligations within the general area of terms 
and conditions of employment brought under the regime of the 
collective bargaining agreement and (2) implying restrictions 
upon management by drawing the boundary line more favorably 
to the union. One could put the discharge and subcontracting 
cases in more familiar terms than I have used by saying that the 
critical issue is whether a collective bargaining agreement is simply 
a document by which the union and the employees have imposed 
upon management limited restrictions of its otherwise absolute 
right to manage the enterprise, so that an employee's claim must 
always fail unless he can point to a specific contract provision on 
which the claim is founded. But this reserved-rights phraseology 
obscures the very distinction which I wish to press. Management 
and labor are certainly free to bring some areas of mutual concern 
under the regime of collective bargaining and to assign others 
exclusively to management. This is true as a matter of legal theory, 
and the freedom is exercised as a matter of practical living. Within 
the area put under the regime of collective bargaining, however, 
it is hardly practicable to make the contract the exclusive source 
of rights, remedies and duties. There are too many people, too 
many problems, too many unforeseeable contingencies, too many 
variations-one cannot reduce all the· rules governing the com-
munity of an industrial plant to fifteen or even fifty pages. The 
logic of the governmental nature of the process of collective bar-
gaining therefore creates a strong presumption that within the 
sphere of collective bargaining the parties, if they had thought 
about it, would have acknowledged the need and therefore the 
existence of a common law of the shop which furnishes the con-
text of, and also implements, the agreement. Interpretation should 
give effect to this presumption arising from the very nature of 
a collective agreement unless the agreement states a contrary rule 
in pretty plain language. 
A good. many people experienced in management may spon-
taneously challenge the statement that the contract cannot be the 
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exclusive guide to all questions arising thereunder but I suspect 
that when pressed, most of them will concede the accuracy of my 
presumption in the only sense in which I intend it. Many ~ontracts 
limit the employer's right to discharge employees to cases w~ere 
there is "just cause" but say nothing about the power to impose 
lesser discipline. Does anyone deny an arbitrator appointed under 
such a contract the power to decide whether there was just cause for 
a disciplinary layoff even though his jurisdiction is limited to the 
"interpretation and application of any provision of this agree-
ment"? Again, suppose that a contract fixes a seven-day time limit 
upon the appeal of grievances from the foreman's ruling and that 
the employee and shop steward wait ten days to appeal upon the 
strength of the personnel director's specific assurance that the com-
pany will not enforce the time limit. Surely there are only a few 
stern literalists who would deny the grievance without examining 
the merits if the company invoked the time limit as a bar to ar-
bitration. The customary disposition would be to ignore the time 
limit upon grounds of waiver or estoppel. These doctrines ob-
viously grant remedies, if not rights, based upon motions of justice 
which are not spelled out in the agreement. And does not an 
arbitrator resort to such a body of law when he grants reinstate-
ment with back pay as a remedy for an unjustified discharge?81 
Occasionally arbitrators and courts have come into conflict 
because of the court's failure to perceive this need for an industrial 
jurisprudence within the area of labor-management relations 
brought under the joint authority of management and labor. A 
Remington Rand contract provided: "Seniority ... is defined to 
mean length of service with the Company ~ince the last date of 
hire at whatever location and in whatever capacity employed." 
An employee who had resigned was rehired on September 25, 
1950. As a result of a mistake, however, the company record gave 
him the seniority date of May 21, 1945, which was the date of his 
original employment prior to the resignation. The erroneous date 
was carried fonvard for five years in published seniority listings. 
It was the basis upon which two prior grievances had been adjusted 
at the local level. Thereafter the company attempted to correct 
Bl Compare Refinery Employees Union v. Continental Oil Co., (W.D. La. 1958) 160 
F. Supp. 723, with such arbitration decisions as International Harvester Co., 9 Lab. Arb. 
Rep. 894 (1947); Phillips Chemical Co., 17 Lab. Arb. Rep. 721 (1951); and Mississippi 
Aluminum Co., 27 Lab. Arb. Rep. 625 (1956). 
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the seniority date in offering an opportunity for promotion. The 
arbitrator held that the seniority list had become frozen despite 
the mistake. "[T]here must come a time when past errors which 
have not been challenged or corrected by either party, or by in-
dividual employees, must be accepted as the agreed understanding 
and no longer subject to change."82 
The Supreme Court of New York vacated the award upon the 
employer's motion. The judge declared that the ruling "flies in 
the face of the words of the contract" and expressed wonderment 
that "highly qualified and sincere arbitrators" could have reached 
such a result.83 The explanation is both simple and revealing. The 
arbitrator recognized that every contract must be interpreted and 
applied through an industrial jurisprudence. The judge felt bound 
to the written word, although courts have exercised greater liber-
ality for centuries in applying the Statute of Frauds. In my opinion 
the judge made a serious error. 
The imperative which requires a body of "common law" in the 
area marked off by the contract for government under the regime 
established by the contract has no place in deciding what area has 
been marked off. There is nothing in the function of a collective 
bargaining agreement which makes the reserved management 
rights view, when confined to this issue, either more or less serv-
iceable than the opposing view sometimes espoused by labor 
unions. Nor can guidance be found in an underlying purpose or 
intent unless those words include a purpose to strike a compromise, 
for on this issue management and union usually stand in opposi-
tion. Where then is the judge or arbitrator to turn in deciding the 
discharge or subcontracting question, or any other issue concern-
ing the scope of area marked off for government under the contract 
but on which the contract is silent? 
I have no answer to these questions-only a conviction that the 
search is one which ought to be pursued more consciously in gen-
eral terms, even though the answer is the pot of gold at the end 
of the rainbow. Ideally the parties should write the answer into 
the contract, for the choice is theirs, but often the difference of 
opinion is too deep and too enduring for either party to express 
in writing even its temporary acceptance of the position of the 
other. While arbitrators can get along by saying that each case 
82 Remington Rand Co., 27 Lab. Arb. Rep. 880 at 887-889 (1956). 
83 In re IUE, 27 Lab. Arb. Rep. 779 at 780 (1957). 
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must be decid~d on its merits, the courts can hardly be expected 
to accept this view unless it is made part of a coherent philosophy. 
And as I suggested in the beginning, LMRA section 30 I and the 
Lincoln Mills decision make it impossible for arbitrators to go 
their separate way much longer brushing off judicial attitudes 
as the result of immersion in ordinary contracts and ignorance of 
the peculiarities of collective bargaining agreements. 
One possible course is to accept the "reserved rights" view 
subject to the two qualifications already suggested. Most judges 
appear to adopt this position without the qualifications, although 
few of them have felt impelled to state the doctrine squarely. 
Professor Gregory may overstate the case when he says that apart 
from its unpopularity with unions the doctrine is generally ac-
cepted, but I suspect that a poll of arbitrators would give the 
doctrine a majority, provided that the ballot was secret. Further-
more, it is at least historically accurate to describe collective agree-
ments as instruments by which the unions have gradually taken 
away the erstwhile prerogatives of management.84 
The alternative may be stated as follows. Every collective 
bargaining agreement is by its very nature the product of conflict-
ing desires concerning the sphere of joint government established 
by the collective agreement. Sometimes the sphere is expressly 
delineated with all the rest reserved as management prerogatives 
but as often as not the impossibility of making an explicit com-
promise, coupled ·with the impossibility of not reaching an agree-
ment, results in a more or less ambiguous silence. The task of 
finding where the boundaries would have been drawn if the parties 
who signed the contract had drawn them explicitly is then a prob-
lem of interpretation within the jurisdiction of the arbitrator who 
is given power to decide questions concerning the interpretation 
and application of the agreement. For it is the agreement that 
draws the boundary line even though it does not draw it expressly. 
The interpreter must remember that the contract goes a distance 
but also that it stops, because it is a product of competing wills and 
its policy inheres as much in its limitations as in its affirmations. 
Nor is the interpreter left wholly without guidance. Even a vague 
84 The reserved rights theory may have to be modified in order to accommodate it 
to the theory of collective bargaining developed under the National Labor Relations Act. 
See Cox and Dunlop, "The Duty To Bargain Collectively During the Term of an Existing 
Agreement," 63 HARv. L. REv. 1097 (1950). At the moment I am concerned only with 
what is brought under the rule of the contract. 
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management-functions clause suggests that the boundaries may be 
narrower than under a contract without it. An integrated writing 
clause bespeaks narrow interpretation. Surely an open-ended arbi-
tration clause indicates a wider area of joint sovereignty than a 
clause limiting the arbitrator to the interpretation and application 
of the contract. In the discharge case it would not be implausible 
to conclude, if the words of the contract are otherwise blind, that 
review of discharges to determine whether there is just cause is 
more consistent with a contract granting other forms of job se-
curity and industrial justice than is the reservation of untram-
melled power to discharge for any reason which the employer 
deems sufficient. The plausibility is less, if indeed there is any, in 
the case of subcontracting or shift schedules. 
These last suggestions are the common stuff of arbitration 
decisions, but there is need for a coherent rationalization if this 
conception of the arbitrator's task is to find its way into the law 
of collective bargaining agreements. The suggestions made here 
are hardly a beginning. A single word may be added in conclusion. 
In the final analysis the arbitrator or the judge must make a choice. 
He may be an activist and impose his view upon the agreement 
when its words leave scope, bringing doubtful territory into the 
joint realm because he thinks that he knows that this is fair and 
good industrial relations. A wise and respected man may do much 
good through this conception of the arbitrator's function. It may 
also be right to follow the quieter role which Learned Hand 
assigns a judge in interpreting a statute the reach of which was 
sharply disputed. 
" ... But the judge must always remember that he should go 
no further than the government would have gone, had it been 
faced with the case before him. If he is in doubt, he must stop, 
for he cannot tell that the conflicting interests in the society 
for which he speaks would have come to a just result, even 
though he is sure that he knows what the just result should be. 
He is not to substitute even his juster will for theirs; otherwise 
it would not be the common-will which prevails, and to that 
extent the people would not govern."85 
The parties can make the choice when they select their 
arbitrator. 
85 Hand, "How Far Is a Judge Free in Rendering a Decision?" in Law Series I, 
Lecture 14 at 5 (National Advisory Council on Radio in Education, 1933). 
